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Abstract 
Previous research demonstrated that contingency learning can take place in the absence of the 
intention to learn. For instance, in the colour-word contingency learning task each distracting 
word is presented most often in a given target colour (e.g., “month” in red; “plate” in green) and 
less often in the other colours. Participants respond faster and more accurately when the word is 
presented in the expected relative to an unexpected colour even though there is no reason why 
they would have the intention to learn the contingencies between the words and the colours. It 
remains to be determined, however, whether learning in such situations would benefit or suffer 
from adding the goal to learn contingencies. In the reported experiment, half of the participants 
were informed that each word was presented most often in a certain colour and were instructed to 
try to learn these contingencies. The other half of the participants were not informed that 
contingencies would be present. Participants given the explicit learning goal produced a larger 
contingency effect in response times than the control participants. In contrast to some results 
from other learning paradigms, our results suggest that intentional learning adds to, rather than 
interferes with, unintentional learning, and we propose an explanation for some conflicting 
results. 
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Goal-Dependent Learning in the Colour-Word Contingency Learning Paradigm: 
Adding the Goal to Learn Strengthens Learning in an Unintentional Learning Task 
 Within the literature on human contingency learning (Schmidt, in press) several 
paradigms have emerged that have proved useful in the study of unintentional learning processes. 
One example of this is the colour-word contingency learning paradigm introduced by Schmidt 
and colleagues (Schmidt & Besner, 2008; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & Besner, 2007; Schmidt 
& De Houwer, 2011a, 2011b; Schmidt, De Houwer, & Besner, 2010). In this paradigm, each 
distracting word is presented most often in a certain target colour (e.g., “month” most often in 
red, “plate” most often in green, etc.) and participants respond faster and more accurately to trials 
where the word is presented in its high contingency colour (e.g., “month” in red) relative to a low 
contingency colour (e.g., “month” in green). Contingency awareness is generally quite limited in 
this paradigm and learning seems to often occur without awareness (Schmidt et al., 2007). 
Because participants are typically unaware of the contingencies, it is unlikely that they have the 
intention to learn them. Moreover, instructions remain silent about the presence of the 
contingencies and participants are not asked to learn them. One could argue that participants 
might still form the intention to learn the contingencies in order to improve their performance in 
the reaction time task. However, the reaction time task is so simple (i.e., reacting to colours) and 
reaction times are so short that an intentional strategy to use contingency knowledge in order to 
improve performance is likely to backfire and actually hamper performance. Hence, the goal to 
learn does not appear to be necessary for colour-word contingency learning. 
 One issue that has received relatively less attention is whether colour-word contingency 
learning (and human contingency learning in general) is moderated by the goal to learn. In the 
current research, we investigated what impact explicit learning goals have on the amount of 
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learning occurring in a paradigm that would otherwise result in unintentional learning, namely 
the colour-word contingency learning paradigm. We use the term “unintentional learning 
paradigm” to refer to a learning task that, in the absence of the instruction to learn contingencies, 
would result in unintentional learning. 
 Intuitively, one would imagine that the goal to learn can only have a positive effect on the 
resultant learning. However, previous work assessing the impact of goals on learning in 
unintentional learning paradigms revealed null results or even a counterintuitive decrease in the 
size of learning effects as the result of inducing the goal to learn. In artificial grammar learning 
work, Forkstam, Elwér, Ingvar, and Petersson (2008) compared learning in participants who 
were informed that there would be contingencies that made for an artificial grammar with 
learning in participants who were not informed. No effects of instruction on learning were found. 
Reber (1976), in contrast, actually observed decreased learning of the grammar when given the 
explicit goal to learn. These results suggest that the goal to learn interferes with unintentional 
learning. 
 Similar results have been reported in the evaluative conditioning literature. For instance, 
Fulcher and Hammerl (2001) paired some neutral haptic (touch) stimuli with positive haptic 
stimuli and others with other neutral haptic stimuli. A standard evaluative conditioning effect is 
observed when the positively-conditioned neutral stimuli are rated more positively than the 
neutrally-conditioned neutral stimuli. However, this pattern was reversed in the participants that 
were told to learn the contingencies. Hence, in this case, the explicit goal to learn seems to 
override the normal learning process rather than strengthen it. 
 In order to assess the role of goals on contingency learning in the colour-word 
contingency learning paradigm, half of the participants in our experiment were assigned to an 
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instruction group and half to a control group. As is typical in most experiments on unintentional 
contingency learning, control participants were not told about the contingencies at the start of the 
experiment. In contrast, instructed participants were told that word-colour contingency 
relationships would be present in the task and that they should try to learn them. Subjective 
contingency awareness (i.e., verbal acknowledgement of noticing the contingencies) and 
objective contingency awareness (i.e., above chance guessing of which word went with which 
colour) were also assessed. 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-six Ghent University Dutch speaking undergraduates participated in the experiment 
in exchange for €4. 
Apparatus 
 Stimulus and response timing were controlled by E-Prime software (Experimental 
Software Tools, 2002). Using an AZERTY keyboard, participants pressed the “J” key for red, the 
“K” key for yellow, and the “L” key for green in the main learning task and the objective 
awareness task. Participants pressed the “j” key for “ja” (yes) or the “n” key for “nee” (no) on 
the subjective awareness question. 
Materials and Design 
 Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the screen. Stimuli were presented on 
a black background and consisted of three neutral five-letter Dutch words (onder [under], maand 
[month], plaat [plate]) presented in three different print colours (red, yellow, green). One word 
(e.g., onder) was presented most often (8 of 10 times) in red, another word (e.g., maand) most 
often in yellow, and the third (e.g., plaat) most often in green. Words were presented equally 
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often (1 of 10 times) in each of the remaining two colours. High contingency trials are trials in 
which the word is presented in its most frequent colour. Low contingency trials are trials in 
which the word is presented in another colour. The contingency effect is the difference in 
response time or accuracy between these two types of trials. The high contingency colour for 
each word was randomly determined for each participant. Words were presented in bold, 18 pt. 
Courier New font. The RGB values for the display colours were 255,0,0 (red), 255,255,0 
(yellow), and 0,255,0 (green). 
Procedure 
 First, participants were told that they would be responding to the print colour of words. 
Only participants in the instructed group (N = 23) were then given the following (translated) 
additional instructions: 
Note: Each word in the experiment is presented most often in a certain color. 
Specifically, one word is presented most often in red, another word is presented most 
often in yellow, and a third word is presented most often in green. Try to learn which 
word is presented in which color as you perform the task. 
Each trial began with a white fixation “+” for 150 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 
150 ms, followed by a coloured word for 2000 ms or until a response was made. Following 
correct responses, the next trial started immediately. If the trial timed out or an incorrect 
response was made, “XXX” in white was presented for 500 ms, followed by the next trial. We 
presented 200 trials, selected at random with replacement. Afterwards, contingency awareness 
was assessed. Participants were first asked whether they noticed the word-colour contingencies 
(subjective contingency awareness), with the question being essentially identical to the learning 
goal instruction. After this, participants were asked to guess which colour each word was 
presented most often in (objective awareness). 
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Results 
 Mean correct response latencies and percentage error data were analyzed (see Figure 1). 
Trials on which participants failed to respond (less than 1% of the data) were removed from 
analyses. The correlations used for the awareness data are nonparametric Spearman’s ρ, which 
better controls for the influence of outliers with small sample sizes. Correlations with parametric 
Pearson’s r were essentially identical. 
Response Latencies 
 An ANOVA for response latencies with the factors of contingency (high vs. low) and 
group (instructed vs. control) revealed a significant main effect of contingency, F(1,44) = 
46.737, MSE = 1506, p < .001, 2pη  = .51, indicating overall faster responses for high relative to 
low contingency trials. The main effect of group was not significant, F(1,44) = 1.918, MSE = 
11569, p = .173, 2pη  = .04. Critically, the interaction between contingency and group was 
significant, F(1,44) = 4.419, MSE = 1506, p = .041, 2pη  = .09, indicating a significantly larger 
contingency effect for the instructed group relative to controls. Planned comparisons revealed 
that the contingency effect was significant both for participants in the instructed group (high: 547 
ms; low: 620 ms), t(22) = 5.583, SEdiff = 13, p < .001, 2pη  = .59, and for participants in the control 
group (high: 533 ms; low: 572 ms), t(22) = 3.950, SEdiff = 10, p < .001, 2pη  = .38. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
Percentage Error 
 An ANOVA for errors with the factors of contingency (high vs. low) and group 
(instructed vs. control) revealed a significant main effect of contingency, F(1,44) = 24.604, MSE 
= 16, p < .001, 2pη  = .35, indicating overall less errors on high relative to low contingency trials. 
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The main effect of group was also significant, F(1,44) = 5.177, MSE = 28, p = .028, 2pη  = .10, 
showing fewer errors in the control group than in the instructed group. Although numerically in 
the expected direction, the interaction between contingency and group was not significant, 
F(1,44) = .943, MSE = 16, p = .337, 2pη  = .02. Planned comparisons revealed that the 
contingency effect was significant both for participants in the instructed group (high: 5.0%; low: 
9.9%), t(22) = 3.999, SEdiff = 1.2, p < .001, 2pη  = .42, and for participants in the control group 
(high: 3.3%; low: 6.6%), t(22) = 2.973, SEdiff = 1.1, p = .007, 2pη  = .29. 
Contingency Awareness 
 Overall, contingency awareness was high in this experiment, probably due to the very 
strong contingency manipulation (i.e., 80% high contingency trials). In the instructed group, 21 
of 23 participants (91%) said that they were aware of the word-colour contingencies (subjective 
awareness). In the control group, 17 of 23 participants (74%) said that they were aware. This 
four participant (17%) difference is suggestive, but was not statistically significant, t(44) = 
1.563, SEdiff = 11, p = .125, 2pη  = .05. Subjective awareness did, however, correlate significantly 
with the size of the error contingency effect, ρ(44) = .349, p = .017, and marginally with the 
response time contingency effect, ρ(44) = .268, p = .072. Objective awareness was 96% in the 
instructed group and 88% in the control group. This 8% difference was again suggestive, but not 
significant, t(44) = 1.003, SEdiff = 7, p = .321, 2pη  = .02. These rates of objective awareness were 
well above chance (33%) in both the instructed, t(22) = 19.547, SE = 3, p < .001, 2pη  = .95, and 
control conditions, t(22) = 8.468, SE = 7, p < .001, 2pη  = .77. Like the subjective awareness 
measure, objective awareness was significantly related to the size of the error contingency effect, 
ρ(44) = .311, p = .035, and marginally with the response time contingency effect, ρ(44) = .259, p 
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= .083. 
Discussion 
 In the reported study, we assessed the impact of explicit learning goals on the size of the 
colour-word contingency learning effect. Our results demonstrated a clear beneficial effect. 
Relative to participants in the control condition, participants given contingency learning 
instructions showed an 87% significant increase in the size of the response time effect and a 48% 
nonsignificant numerical increase in the size of the error effect. Thus, our data show that the 
conscious intent to learn can have a beneficial effect on the resultant unintentional learning. 
 On the other hand, a small number of earlier studies concerning the effects of goals on 
artificial grammar learning (e.g., Reber, 1967) and evaluative conditioning (e.g., Fulcher & 
Hammerl, 2001) revealed a negative effect of the goal to learn on contingency learning. One 
interpretation of these negative effects is that the goal to learn activates explicit learning 
processes that counteract and sometimes overrule implicit learning processes (e.g., Reber, 1989; 
see Lieberman, Chang, Chiao, Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2004, for neurological evidence). Such 
an account, of course, has difficultly explaining the beneficial effects of goals in the present 
experiment. 
 One could posit, however, that the negative effects of the goal to learn in artificial 
grammar learning studies is related to the complexity of the information to be learned in those 
studies (i.e., the artificial grammar). This would imply that the goal to learn is beneficial when 
the to-be-learned information is simple (e.g., the simple contingencies in our study) but 
detrimental when the to-be-learned information is complex. If participants are left to rely on 
unintentional learning only, then they might be more effective at picking up the more complex 
relationships, whereas the introduction of a learning goal causes participants to rely on simpler 
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(but less correct) contingencies. This account in terms of difficulty does not, however, explain 
the negative effects of the goal to learn in evaluative conditioning studies. As in our study, 
evaluative conditioning studies typically involve only simple contingencies between two stimuli. 
 Another possibility is that the difference results from the use of judgment versus 
performance tasks. Some have argued that judgement tasks (i.e., tasks in which learning is 
assessed on the basis of judgements; e.g., a standard evaluative conditioning task) and 
performance tasks (i.e., tasks in which learning is inferred from reaction time performance; e.g., 
colour-word contingency) are driven by inherently different types of learning (see Shanks & St. 
John, 1994, for a review). It may be the case that the harmful effects of intentional learning in 
evaluative conditioning and artificial grammar learning are due to the use of a classification 
judgement response (i.e., judgements of liking or grammaticality). For instance, in an evaluative 
taste conditioning experiment participants may normally learn which neutral taste goes with 
which valenced taste and subsequently rate neutral stimuli based on the valenced stimuli with 
which they were paired. However, when given explicit learning instructions participants may feel 
that their subsequent ratings of the neutral stimuli should not be based on the pairings and 
overcompensate their valence ratings in the reverse direction. Thus, the learning of the 
relationships between stimuli may not actually be impaired. Indeed, contingency awareness is 
generally increased under such conditions (Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990). Rather, 
participants might be merely changing how they decide to classify stimuli when given different 
instructions. Because participants can easily control their judgements, learning as assessed by 
judgements is very susceptible to these kinds of conscious strategies. 
 A similar argument could be made for the reduced learning effects of Reber (1967) with 
explicit learning instructions. Because participants in the instructed group were told to explicitly 
GOALS IN CONTINGENCY LEARNING 11 
learn the grammar they might be less inclined to base their judgements on intuition or gut 
feelings. Thus, unintentional learning (which might be more potent than intentional learning) 
would be undermined. As with the evaluative conditioning work participants may not be 
learning contingencies to a lesser extent. Their intuitions may still be shaped by the 
contingencies. Rather, they may simply be expressing that learning differently with a change in 
their approach to categorization after being giving learning instructions. In other words, their 
conscious strategy for making judgements might lead to the absence or reversal of the effect. In 
that sense, instructions in such paradigms reduce the observed learning effect, but not learning 
per se. 
 For this reason, a performance (i.e., response time) task such as the colour-word 
contingency learning task will not produce this same detrimental effect of explicit learning 
instructions. As noted earlier, it is unlikely that participants intentionally use the contingencies to 
speed colour identification performance, particularly given the speeded nature of the task. In fact, 
participants probably have little control over how learned information about contingencies 
influences their reaction time performance, thus making it unlikely that a conscious strategy to 
use or not use contingency knowledge will counteract unintentional learning. More generally, the 
explicit instruction to learn contingencies might always strengthen learning, perhaps even in the 
tasks that have previously shown negative effects (e.g., where the benefit is concealed by the 
costs associated with a categorization response). More work, of course, is warranted before 
making any strong conclusions on this matter. Whatever the actual cause of the discrepancy 
between our findings and previous findings, our study clearly shows that the goal to learn 
contingencies can facilitate learning, even in a paradigm that would otherwise result in 
unintentional learning. 
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 Consistent with our findings, some other recent research has shown positive effects of 
goals on learning, though with goals of a different sort. In two unconscious goal pursuit 
experiments, Eitam, Hassin, and Schul (2008) demonstrated that implicitly-primed performance 
goals (i.e., the goal to perform well in the task) had a facilitative effect on implicit learning 
effects. Similarly, Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, and Mussweiler (2009) primed participants with 
the implicit goal to process similarities versus differences between stimuli and found that the 
goal to process similarities between stimuli lead to larger evaluative conditioning effects. 
Although performance goals such as these are clearly quite different than the goal to learn used 
in the present investigation, these past reports are consistent with our findings in showing that 
goals can have a positive influence on the amount of learning observed. 
 The question then arises as to what mechanism leads to an increase in learning with the 
introduction of a learning goal. One possibility is that goals lead to explicit knowledge about the 
contingency relations and that this explicit knowledge is used in combination with the 
unintentionally-learned contingencies to produce a larger contingency effect. Indeed, while 
contingency learning in our paradigm seems to often occur without awareness (for related work, 
see Carlson & Flowers, 1996; Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999; 
Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992; Mayr, 1996; McKelvie, 1987; Nissen & Bullemer, 1987; 
Song, Howard, & Howard, 2007), the present results suggest that contingency awareness might 
help, as indicated by the positive correlations between awareness and the learning effects. 
 Another possibility is that explicit goals lead to an increase in attention to the predictive 
dimension (i.e., the word in our paradigm) as a result of the fact that the predictive dimension is 
more relevant to the task. Indeed, work with various paradigms has demonstrated that attention 
to the predictive dimension is crucial for contingency learning to occur (e.g., Eitam, Schul, & 
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Hassin, 2009; Jiang & Chun, 2001; Jiménez & Méndez, 1999). Thus, it could be the case that 
participants in the instructed group attend more to the word than participants in the control 
condition, which could lead to stronger encoding of the current trial and/or retrieval of 
previously encountered trials. Whatever the mechanism that mediates the impact of goals to learn 
on unintentional learning, our results show that the goal to learn can improve unintentional 
learning. As such, it sheds new light on the relation between goals and learning in general. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Response latencies, standard errors, and error percentages as a function of contingency 
and instruction group. 
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